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Dispersion Requirements for the Siting of
Group Homes: Reconciling New York's
Padavan Law with the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988
KEVIN J. ZANNERt
Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pro-
nounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the
purpose.1
INTRODUCTION
The deinstitutionalization of individuals with mental and
physical handicaps through the use of residential group home set-
tings has generated a storm of controversy in recent years.' Munic-
ipalities and siting agencies have struggled to integrate these indi-
viduals into residential communities, often encountering the
familiar cry of "not in my backyard."' A number of states have
responded to the group home siting controversy by enacting stat-
utes which codify procedures and criteria for the placement of
group homes in residential communities.4 While wide ranging in
scope, many of these statutes include dispersion requirements
which aim to prevent the concentration of group homes in one
area.5 One such law, New York's Padavan Law, permits municipal-
t J.D. Candidate, May 1996, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
2. See, e.g., Alex Rodriguez, Suburban Group Homes Find No Welcome Mats, CH.
SuN-TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1995, at 4; Greenville Journal; Are Six Group Homes Too Many?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, at A16 [hereinafter Greenville Journal]; Phil Fairbanks, City Rejects
Plan for Shelter after Protests by Neighbors, BUFF. NEWS, May 26, 1994, at C1.
3. See Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of Nimby, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994).
4. See Lester D. Steinman, The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions on the Establishment
of Community Residences for the Disabled: A National Study, 19 URB. LAW. 1, 25-37
(1987). Steinman's article includes an appendix describing each state law in terms of the
type of facility covered, the number of residents, zoning requirements, conditions on use,
dispersion of facilities, and licensing requirements. Id.
5. Id; see ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(H) (1986) (requiring that there be 1200 feet
between homes); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-115(2)(b), 31-23-303(2)(b) (1986 and Supp.
1990) (750 feet between homes); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3f (1994) (1000 feet between homes);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4923(c) (1989) (5000 feet between homes); IND. CODE 12-28-4-7(b)
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ities to reject a proposed group home siting for the mentally dis-
abled' upon a showing that establishment of the facility "would
result in such a concentration of community residential facilities
* . .that the nature and character of the areas within the munici-
pality would be substantially altered."17
Federal legislation has also attempted to address the problem
of housing discrimination against individuals with handicaps. In
1988, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendments Act
[FHAA], which prohibits housing discrimination against individu-
als on the basis of handicap.8 The legislation requires that persons
with disabilities be treated as individuals, and further prohibits
the application of land-use regulations which deny those individu-
als the right to choose their own residence."
Federal laws prohibiting housing discrimination and state and
local legislation which regulate group home siting through distance
requirements present different, and possibly conflicting views re-
garding the treatment of individuals with handicaps in residential
communities.1" This Note will attempt to reconcile the goals of the
(1993) (3000 feet between homes); IOWA CODE § 335.25(3) (1995) (size of a city block be-
tween homes); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:478(B) (West 1989) (1000 feet between homes); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-4(4) (West Supp. 1994) (1500 feet between homes; excessive
concentration prohibited) (repealed 1987); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.216(a)(4),
125.583(b)(4) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995) (1500 feet between residences; 3000 feet in cities
over one million in population; no excessive concentration); Mo. REV. STAT. § 89.020(2)
(1994) (municipality may set reasonable density standard); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1746 (1983)
(1200 feet between homes) (repealed 1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:55D-66.1 (Supp. 1995)
(1500 feet between homes); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney 1988) (over-
concentration of similar residences resulting in a substantial alteration of an area prohib-
ited); N.C. GEN. STAT § 168-22(a) (Supp. 1994) (.5 mile between homes); TEx. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art 101in (West Supp. 1988) (.5 mile between homes) (repealed 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-27-602(2)(f) (1991) (.75 mile between homes); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 4409(d) (1992) (1000 feet between homes); W. VA. CODE § 27-17-2(a) (1992) (1200 feet
between homes outside of municipality).
6. The Padavan Law does not apply to group home sitings for individuals with physical
disabilities, persons with AIDS, or recovering substance abusers. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 41.34(a)(1) (McKinney 1988). Any reference to the "handicapped" or "disabled" in the
Padavan statute refers strictly to individuals with mental or developmental disabilities. Id.
This comment will not attempt to gauge the legal controversy surrounding group home sit-
ings in New York State which do not fall within the scope of the Padavan Law. However,
references to such controversies may be made in light of litigation concerning the discrimi-
nation protections for the handicapped under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.
See infra note 70.
7. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(C) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-31 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
9. See infra note 60.
10. See generally Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for
the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987) (arguing that by labeling the disabled as different, efforts to
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FHAA and the use of dispersion requirements for group homes for
handicapped persons.1 It will be argued that the use of dispersion
requirements fails to meet the mandate of the FHAA, which treats
all disabled persons as individuals."2 Particularly problematic are
distance limitations enacted through local ordinances, for they can
be employed to frustrate the efforts of providers who wish to place
group homes in residential communities. However, the use of such
requirements through state mandated processes such as the
Padavan Law appears to foster the goal of deinstitutionalization by
providing a "neutral" method by which group home sites are se-
lected. While state site selection laws do impose burdens on hous-
ing for individuals with handicaps, these burdens are reasonably
related to the goal of deinstitutionalization, for they provide those
individuals with the opportunity to live in communities where local
opposition would otherwise foreclose such an opportunity. It will
be further argued, however, that state site selection laws can be
improved by eliminating rigid distance requirements and adopting
a dispersion standard based on reasonableness which better com-
ports with the FHAA mandate.
Part I of this Note will discuss the Padavan Law, focusing first
on its history and purpose, then moving to a general discussion of
the law itself. Constitutional challenges to the law and the general
applicability of the overconcentration provision will be addressed
as well.13
Part II will address the federal legislation, focusing exclusively
on the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. The intent of the
create equality through the law are in effect, undermined).
11. For works which consider related topics, see Alicia Hancock Apfel, Comment, Cast
Adrift: Homeless Mentally Ill, Alcoholic and Drug Addicted, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 551
(1995); Harold A. Ellis, Comment, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes
of Zoning, 7 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 275 (1992); David Bernstein, From Pesthouses to
AIDS Hospices: Neighbors' Irrational Fears of Treatment Facilities for Contagious Dis-
eases, 22 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 1 (1990); Marc B. Goldstein et al., Public Preferences
and Site Location of Residential Treatment Facilities, 17 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 186
(1989); Michael P. Seng, Discrimination Against Families and Handicapped Persons
Under the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 22 J. MARSHALL L. RE V. 541 (1989);
Paul Fleischut, Comment, Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: A Critical Analysis of
"Familial Status", 54 Mo. L. REv. 393 (1989); James C. Frooman, Comment, Statutory
Analysis of the Familial Status Provision of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 -
or, "Why Do I Have to Live With Those Curtain Climbing Rug Rats?", 17 N. Ky. L. REv.
215 (1989); William Graham, Note, There Goes the Neighborhood: The Evolution of "Fam-
ily" in Local Zoning Ordinances, 9 TouRo L. REv. 699 (1993); Katherine Baird Russo, Note,
Neighborhood Character and SEQRA: Courts Struggle with Homeless Shelters, Prisons,
and the Environment, 14 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 231 (1989).
12. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
13. See discussion infrd'part I.
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FHAA will be analyzed, particularly the language of the House Re-
port, which provides strong evidence that dispersion requirements
violate the FHAA.14 Two federal cases, Familystyle of St. Paul,
Inc. v. City of St. Paul1" and Horizon House Developmental Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Township of Upper Southhampton"8 will be ex-
amined at length for their contrasting views regarding the legality
of dispersion requirements under the FHAA. 17 In addition, subse-
quent case law which has relied on the holdings of Familystyle and
Horizon House will be reviewed, with the goal of developing a clear
picture of the rationales which anchor both of those decisions.1 8
Finally, Part III will return to the Padavan Law to discuss the
interaction between the New York's siting procedure and the
FHAA. The benefits of the state law will be compared with the
burdens it places on group homes to locate within communities.
Possible alternative approaches to the saturation provision will be
presented as well.1 9 Part IV will attempt to bring together the vari-
ous arguments to present the reader with a concise view of the re-
lationship between dispersion requirements and the FHAA.2 0
I. THE PADAVAN LAW
A. Historical Overview
The movement to deinstitutionalize individuals with mental
handicaps arose in part through the realization that the lives of
mentally handicapped individuals could be improved if those indi-
viduals were placed in normal residential settings.21 Prior to the
enactment of the Padavan Law however, there was no state-wide
procedure for the siting of group homes for mentally handicapped
persons in residential communities. Often, sponsoring agencies 22
would be required to show that its particular group home consti-
14. See discussion infra part II.A.
15. 728 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Minn. 1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
16. 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992), afl'd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
17. See discussion infra part II.B.
18. See discussion infra part II.C.
19. See discussion infra part III.
20. See discussion infra part IV.
21. For a concise background on the development of both the federal and state policy
of deinstitutionalization, see Robert L. Schonfeld, "Five-Hundred-Year Flood Plains" and
Other Unconstitutional Challenges to the Establishment of Community Residences for the
Mentally Retarded, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3-7 (1988) [hereinafter Unconstitutional
Challenges].
22. "'Sponsoring agency' means an agency or unit of government, a voluntary agency or
any other person or organization which intends to establish or operate a community residen-
tial facility for the disabled." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(2) (McKinney 1994).
[Vol. 44
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tuted a "family" for purposes of the local zoning ordinance.2" Rec-
ognizing that the "establishment of clearly defined procedures" for
the selection of sites would foster "communication and cooperation
between the various state agencies, local agencies, and local com-
munities," the New York Legislature passed the Padavan Law.24 It
was hoped that the law would ease the difficulties that sponsoring
agencies faced in making community residence placements in the
face of community resistance.25
The Padavan Law attempts to balance the housing rights of
individuals with mental handicaps and the interests of the commu-
nity in where the home is to be located.26 To this end, the law
provides for community input into the siting of group home facili-
ties. The statute authorizes municipal involvement through a man-
23. Terry Rice,- Group Home Site Selection Arouses Opposition, N.Y.L.J. June 10,
1992, at S-1.
24. 1978 New York Laws ch. 468 (McKinney). The declaration of legislative findings
and intent states:
The legislature hereby finds and determines that mentally disabled individuals
have the right to attain the benefits of normal residential surroundings. It is fur-
ther found that the opportunities for mentally disabled individuals will be en-
hanced, and the delivery of services improved, by providing these individuals with
the least restrictive environment that is consistent with their needs, and that such
environment will foster the development of maximum capabilities. It is the inten-
tion of this legislation to meet the needs of the mentally disabled in New York
state by providing, whenever possible, that such persons remain in normal com-
munity settings, receiving such treatment, care, rehabilitation, and education, as
may be appropriate to each individual. It is further intended that communication
and cooperation between the various state agencies, local agencies, and local com-
munities be fostered by this legislation, and that this will be best achieved by
establishment of clearly defined procedures for the selection of locations for com-
munity residences, to best protect the interests of the mentally disabled and en-
sure acceptance of comunity residences by local communities. In the establish-
ment of such community residences, the legislature recognizes the need to avoid,
wherever practicable, a disproportionate distribution of community residences and
other similar facilities.
Id.
25. 1978 N.Y. State Legis. Annual 275 (memorandum of Senator Frank E. Padavan).
26. Id. This balancing of interests permits the municipality to object to a proposed site
if the establishment of the facility would result in an overconcentration of such facilities in
the municipality. It is certainly open to question whether such an objection is sound since it
accepts the premise that the disabled are to be treated differently from other individuals
who live in a residential community. The Padavan Law mandates that group homes be con-
sidered a family for purposes of the statute. If such a home is a family for the purpose of
local laws and ordinances, then why should these same homes be dispersed? A response to
this argument is that it is the group home itself that brings the nonresidential character to a
community. This argument, however, holds little water when a sponsoring agency has pur-
chased an older home and converts it to group home use. See generally Minow, supra note
10.
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dated notice requirement,27 a forty day response period to analyze
the proposal,28 a provision for public hearings,29 and the opportu-
nity for a hearing before the Commissioner ° on the issue of over-
concentration should the municipality object upon those grounds.3 1
The municipality is further entitled to judicial review of the Com-
missioner's decision by means of an Article 78 proceeding.32
B. Constitutional Challenges to the Padavan Law
The Padavan Law survived constitutional challenge in Incor-
porated Village of Old Field v. Introne.33 The Village of Old Field
argued that the law: (1) was an unconstitutional delegation of
power by the Legislature because its definition of "substantial al-
teration" lacked criteria for the determination of such an oc-
curence, (2) was void for vagueness, (3) was violative of plaintiff's
right to due process and equal protection, and (4) disregarded vil-
lage zoning ordinances. 34 The New York Supreme Court rejected
each of these claims.
The court recognized that the Legislature could not delegate
its lawmaking power to an administrative agency, but found there
27. After the site has been selected, the sponsoring agency shall "notify the chief execu-
tive officer of the municipality in writing and include in such notice the specific address of
the site, the type of community residence, the number of residents and the community sup-
port requirements of the program." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney 1994).
For a detailed study of the Padavan Law's procedures and related case law, see Robert L.
Schonfeld, "Not in My Neighborhood:" Legal Challenges to the Establishment of Commu-
nity Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New York State, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281
(1985) [hereinafter Not in My Neighborhood]; See also Rice, supra note 23.
28. The municipality shall have forty days after the receipt of such notice to:
(A) [a]pprove the site recommended ... ; (B) suggest one or more suitable sites
within its jurisdiction which could accommodate such a facility; or (C) object
to the establishment of a facility ... because to do so would result in such a
concentration of community residential facilities for the mentally disabled...
that the nature and character of the areas within the municipality would be
substantially altered.
N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(A-C).
29. Id. at § 41.34(c)(2).
30. The Commissioner, as defined by the Mental Hygiene Law, is "the commissioner of
the office of the department responsible for issuance of license and operating certificate to
the proposed community residential facility." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 41.34(a)(4) (McKin-
ney 1994). Often, this means the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities or the Commissioner of the New York State
Office of Mental Health.
31. Id. at § 41.34(c)(5).
32. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 7801-06 (McKinney 1994). See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 41.34(d) (McKinney 1994).
33. 430 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
34. Id. at 194.
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was no such delegation in the instant case. The Legislature, in de-
fining substantial alteration, was required only to "lay[] down an
'intelligent principle' specifying the standards ... in as detailed a
fashion as is reasonably practicable .... ,5 A precise formula for
the implementation of legislative policy was not necessary where
variable conditions require flexibility and adaptability.3 6
The court further found that the statute was not void for
vagueness, noting that the statute expressed the intent of the Leg-
islature by setting forth procedures by which communities can air
their objections, and specifying the factors the Commissioner must
take into consideration when making a site selection decision. 7
The court also ruled that neither equal protection nor due
process was violated by the enactment of the statute. The court
noted at the onset that it was questionable whether a municipal
corporation such as the Village of Old Field could even claim a
violation of these principles.3 8 Even assuming that the village could
make such a claim, the court refused to find a violation. Character-
izing the "opportunity to be heard . . . [as] an essential" part of
due process, the court held that the Padavan Law passed muster
under due process challenge because the statute provided for a
hearing and judicial review of the Commissioner's decision."9 The
court rejected the equal protection challenge stating that the plain-
tiff "does not even suggest that the statute is without a rational
basis or differentiates in a palpably arbitrary manner."40
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiff's claim that the
Padavan Law disregarded the village zoning ordinance. The court
noted that where local ordinances conflict with and hinder State
public policy, such ordinances will be held as void. 1 According to
the court, the State is permitted to involve itself in local matters
that are of substantial State concern. The police power of the State
may then be used to effectuate State policy, acting to override any
local countervailing concerns.42 Because the policy of deinstitution-
alization is a matter of substantial State concern, the Padavan
Law, written to bring about the integration of individuals with
35. Id. at 195. (quoting City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 156 N.E.2d 301,
304 (N.Y. 1959)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 195-96.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 196.
41. Id.
42. Id. "The police power of the state has never been questioned when it dealt with a
matter of public health and welfare and it should not be limited or whittled away by local
objection." Id.
1996] 255
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mental handicaps into residential communities, will preempt any
local ordinance which conflicts with this policy.43
Constitutional challenges claiming that persons with mental
handicaps are denied equal protection and due process by virtue of
the Padavan Law have also failed. In Di Biase v. Piscitelli44, the
New York State Association for Retarded Children [NYSARC]
cross-claimed against the Commissioners of both the Office of
Mental Health and the Office of Mental Retardation and Develop-
mental Disabilities arguing that section 41.34 of the Mental Hy-
giene Law was unconstitutional.45
NYSARC's principal argument was that the Padavan Law vio-
lated due process and equal protection rights of individuals with
mental handicaps by interfering with their right to purchase and
occupy residential property.46 NYSARC's theory was that by re-
quiring consultation between the sponsor of a proposed community
residence and the municipality in which the home was to be lo-
cated, the State prevented individuals with mental disabilities
from purchasing residential property of their own. 4 The Appellate
Division, Second Department rejected this claim, holding that the
site selection procedure was rationally related48 to the public policy
43. See, e.g., Gedney Assoc. v. State of N.Y. Dep't of Ment. Hyg., 446 N.Y.S.2d 876
(Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that the State is exempt from local building code requirement
which would have affected the proposed construction of eight community homes by the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene for the mentally disabled).
44. 448 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div. 1982).
45. Id. at 35-36.
46. Id. at 36.
47. Id. NYSARC's due process claim was based on the "fundamental right" to prop-
erty. The equal protection claim was premised on the contention that those with mental
handicaps were not permitted to purchase and occupy property as those who were not men-
tally disabled. Id. at 36.
48. The rational basis standard of review employed by the Di Biase court is the same
standard of review employed by the United States Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In that case, a Texas city denied a special use
permit for a group home for the mentally retarded pursuant to its ordinance which required
permits for group homes. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's determination
that mental retardation was a suspect classification entitled to an intermediate level of judi-
cial scrutiny. Id. at 442-47. Instead, the Court held that "[t]o withstand equal protection
review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 446. The Court further stated
that such a standard "affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies
designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently
engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner."
Id. Despite applying only rational basis review, the Court struck down the requirement be-
cause other uses with similar spillovers such as boarding houses, apartments, and nursing
homes were permitted as of right in the particular residential district while the group home
was subject to a permit requirement. Because the legitimate interests of the city (street
congestion, fire hazards, safety concerns) are no more threatened by the location of a group
GROUP HOMES
of deinstitutionalization which the Legislature wished to imple-
ment. The local participation requirement was designed to ensure
that the needs of those with handicaps would be met by establish-
ing group homes "through a process of joint discussion and accom-
modation" between sponsoring agencies and community
representatives.4
The failure of the challenges in Old Field and Di Biase clari-
fies the constitutional parameters within which the Padavan Law
operates. Old Field established the relationship between the
Padavan Law and the state policy of deinstitutionalization. Be-
cause deinstitutionalization is a matter of "substantial state con-
cern," New York, through the Padavan Law, has sharply limited
local municipal control over the placement of such facilities.50 In
effect, Old Field upheld New York's decision to preempt local zon-
ing of group homes for individuals with mental handicaps in favor
of a state mandated process for site selection.
The state interest in deinstitutionalization demonstrated in
Old Field also operates to place burdens on individuals with
mental handicaps. Di Biase recognized these burdens, but found
that the interest furthered by providing a site selection process
outweighed any detrimental impact on the rights of individuals
with mental handicaps. The decision to permit such burdens ap-
pears warranted especially in light of the benefits the Padavan
Law has imparted upon site selection of group homes in New York
State."1
C. Application of the Padavan Law
The site selection process mandated by the Padavan Law has
had a powerful impact in terms of its effectiveness in placing group
homes in residential communities. While procedural challenges
home in the community as opposed to a nursing home, for instance, the permit requirement
had no rational basis, and was therefore, invalid as it applied to the group home. Id. at 449-
50. For articles commenting on or criticizing the Court's rejection of a quasi suspect classifi-
cation for the mentally retarded, see Minow, supra note 10; Unconstitutional Challenges,
supra note 21; Joel Tornari, Comment, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: Equal
Protection for the Mentally Retarded?, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231 (1986); John D. Wil-
son, Comment, Cleburne: An Evolutionary Step in Equal Protection Analysis, 46 MD. L.
REV. 163 (1986).
49. Di Biase v. Piscitelli, 448 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (App. Div. 1982); see also Normal Life of
La., Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Dep't of Inspection & Code Enforcement, 483 So. 2d 1123 (La.
Ct. App. 1986) (upholding a statute requiring sponsor of a proposed community home for
the mentally disabled to secure approval from local governing authority having jurisdiction
over the proposed site).
50. See N.Y. MENrAL HYG. LAw § 41.34(c)(1)(A-C) (McKinney 1994).
51. See infra part Ill.
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such as the failure to provide adequate notice have met with some
success, 52 no New York court has ruled against a proposed siting
where a municipality has objected on grounds of overconcentra-
tion.5 3 Illustrative of this unblemished record is Town of Bruns-
wick v. Webb. 4 In that case, the town presented the testimony of a
real estate expert who concluded that property values would de-
preciate if the community residence was established, resulting in a
substantial alteration in the character of the community.55 The
town further presented residents' concerns over fire and traffic
safety. 6 The court rejected this evidence, finding the testimony
conclusory and insufficient to show a substantial change in the
character of the community.17 Other cases are clearly in accord
with Town of Brunswick, often emphasizing the burden a chal-
52. See Town of Dewitt v. Surles, 561 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1010 (App. Div. 1990) (holding
that the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health failed to give proper
section 41.34 notice to plaintiff town by failing to provide "the most recently published
data" concerning the existence of previously established facilities in the surrounding area,
and failing to disclose the the existence of eight group homes previously established in the
area, including four within town limits). But see Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic Devel-
opmental Disabilities Servs. Office, 459 N.Y.S.2d 109, 112 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that
failure of Commissioner to conduct a hearing within fifteen days of request by the town did
not invalidate site selection because the time requirements under the Padavan Law in this
case were "directory rather than mandatory"; the delay in conducting the hearing gave the
town more time to prepare and "did not frustrate the purpose of section 41.34, to foster
communication and co-operation between State and local agencies and communities . . ").
53. See Town of Mt. Pleasant v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 606 N.Y.S.2d
296 (App. Div. 1994); Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r of N.Y. Office of Mental Health, 595
N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1993); City of Beacon v. Surles, 558 N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 1990);
Town of Poughkeepsie v. Webb, 549 N.Y.S.2d 765 (App. Div. 1990); Paino v. Webb, 544
N.Y.S.2d 159 (App. Div. 1989); Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Webb, 538 N.Y.S.2d 306
(App. Div.), appeal denied, 547 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 1989); Town of Bedford v. State Office of
Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 533 N.Y.S.2d 994 (App. Div. 1988);
Fisher v. Webb, 523 N.Y.S.2d 639 (App. Div. 1988); Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r of N.Y.
Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 517 N.Y.S.2d 29 (App. Div.
1987); Town of Oyster Bay v. Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities,
503 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1986); Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r of N.Y. Office of Mental
Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 503 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div. 1986); Town of Oys-
ter Bay v. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 496 N.Y.S.2d 61
(App. Div. 1985); Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r of N.Y. Office of Mental Retardation &
Developmental Disabilities, 493 N.Y.S.2d 29 (App. Div. 1985); Spielman v. Introne, 451
N.Y.S.2d 194 (App. Div. 1982); Roberts v. Selzak, 452 N.Y.S.2d 113 (App. Div. 1982); Town
of Hempstead v. Comm'r of N.Y. Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities
432 N.Y.S.2d 399 (App. Div. 1980); Collin v. Community Bd. of N.Y., 566 N.Y.S.2d 848
(Sup. Ct. 1991); Gedney Assoc. v. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 446 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup.
Ct. 1982).
54. 535 N.Y.S.2d 831 (App. Div. 1988).
55. Id. at 833.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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lenger to a proposed siting must meet. 8
While the Padavan Law has been successful in selecting group
home sites, it appears that challenges will become more forceful in
the years to come. As the number of group homes in residential
communities increase, New York courts will eventually face a fac-
tual concentration which could warrant the finding of overconcen-
tration.59 By permitting municipalities to object on grounds of
overconcentration, the Padavan Law acknowledges that municipal-
ities are empowered to reject a group home within its boundaries.
Is it possible then that the Padavan Law could become a vehicle
for resistance to group homes in the future? The question which
will be addressed in the following material is whether in light of
this possibility, the overconcentration provision is consistent with
the policy of deinstitutionalization and should be upheld, or should
be rejected as violative of federal fair housing laws protecting indi-
viduals with handicaps.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT
A. Legislative Intent: The House Judiciary Report
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 19880 extended to in-
dividuals with handicaps and families with children8 ' the same
58. See, e.g., Town of Mt. Pleasant v. New York Office of Mental Health, 606 N.Y.S.2d
296 (App. Div. 1994). The court held that:
[t]he party contesting the establishment of a community residential facility must
show that it would result in a concentration of the same or similar facilities such
that the nature and character of the area would be altered. Such challenges may
be sustained only when the evidence offered in opposition is clear and of a con-
vincing nature.
Id. at 298 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Webb
538 N.Y.S.2d 306 (App. Div. 1989) ("Contrary to the petitioner's contentions, the Commis-
sioner's determination which rejected its objections to the establishment of a community
residential facility at the location selected by the respondents is supported by substantial
evidence.").
59. See Greenville Journal, supra note 2; Rice, supra note 23, at S-3.
60. The FHAA provides that it is unlawful:
[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of- (A) that buyer or
renter, (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so
sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that buyer or
renter.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (1988). Furthermore: "[flor purposes of this subsection, discrimina-
tion includes- . . . (B) a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. .. ." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1988).
61. For works discussing the FHAA provisions barring housing discrimination against
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protections that the Fair Housing Act62 had provided twenty years
earlier in prohibiting housing discrimination based on race, color,
religion, national origin and sex. 3 While the Act does not specifi-
cally refer to the problem of group home siting, local laws which
have restricted group homes through the use of zoning regulations
have been challenged as violative of the FHAA6 4
The House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the
amendments provides the strongest evidence that Congress in-
tended to prevent discrimination in housing through the use of re-
strictive or exclusionary zoning decisions. The Report broadly
states the FHAA's "national commitment to end the unnecessary
exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American main-
stream."6 To implement this, the House Committee specifically
called for the "prohibition against discrimination against those
with handicaps apply to zoning decisions and practices," and fur-
ther provided examples of zoning actions which would fall under
the jurisdiction of the Act.6 6 Furthermore, the use or enforcement
of otherwise neutral regulations and rules based on incorrect or
over-protective assumptions or fears was prohibited.6 7
families with children, see supra note 11.
62. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (Supp. 1994)).
63. The Fair Housing Act was amended in 1974 to include gender as a class protected
under the statute. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(1)-(3), 88 Stat. 729
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606).
64. Cindy L. Soper, Comment, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988: New Zon-
ing Rules For Group Homes For the Handicapped, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1033 (1993). See,
e.g., Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 799 F. Supp.
272 (1992), aff'd, 808 F. Supp. 120 (1992) (local zoning law amended to prevent the siting of
a group home for AIDS sufferers violated FHAA); Stewart B. McKinney Found. v. Town
Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Fairfield, 790 F. Supp. 1197 (1992) (holding, in proceeding for
preliminary injunction, that special exception requirement based on the HIV status of the
prospective tenants was potentially violative of the FHAA).
65. H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2179 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
66. Id. at 2185 (emphasis added).
The Committee intends that the prohibition against discrimination against those
with handicaps apply to zoning decisions and practices. The Act is intended to
prohibit the application of special requirements through land-use regulations, re-
strictive covenants, and conditional or special use permits that have the effect of
limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the residence of their choice in
the community.
Id.
67. Id.
Another method of making housing unavailable to people with disabilities has
been the application or enforcement of otherwise neutral rules and regulations on
health, safety and land-use in a manner which discriminates against people with
disabilities. Such discrimination often results from false or over-protective as-
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Besides ensuring access to housing, the House Report also em-
phasized the importance of treating the disabled as individuals.
The clear import of the House Report is that, barring a showing
that a regulation limiting access to housing for individuals with
handicaps is designed to protect safety and health,68 those individ-
uals should have the right to reside in a neighborhood of their
choice, just as any other person."'
B. Dispersion Requirements and the FHAA
The intention of Congress to scrutinize local zoning practices
has resulted in voluminous litigation with conflicting results.70 Dis-
persion requirements for group homes are among the zoning prac-
tices which have been challenged as violative of the FHAA. Two
important cases which address this issue squarely are Familystyle
of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul71 and Horizon House
Developmenal Services., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southamp-
ton. 7 2 While both cases represent substantially different views of
sumptions about the needs of handicapped people, as well as unfounded fears of
difficulties about the problems that their tenancies may pose. These and similar
practices would be prohibited.
Id.
68. Id. The House Report recognized the legitimacy of the safety and health justifica-
tion, as well as the ability of state and local governments to regulate land, but noted that
this "authority has sometimes been used to restrict the ability of individuals with handicaps
to live in communities." When used to impose requirements on congregate living arrang-
ments for non-related persons with disabilities, they have the effect of discriminating
against the handicapped. Id. With this language, the House Report explicitly incorporated
the holding of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) which re-
jected a zoning requirement which was imposed on the non-related handicapped persons,
but not upon families of similar size. There is also some argument that a substantial detri-
mental impact on a neighborhood could also permit the erection of legal barriers to housing
for the handicapped. See Robert L. Schonfeld & Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal Tag-
Team: The Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act and its Use in Obtaining Access to
Housing for Persons with Disabilities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299, 303-04 (1994) [hereinafter
Municipal Tag Team].
69. Municipal Tag Team, supra note 68, at 304.
70. See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (town improperly relied on its zoning laws to exclude home for former substance abus-
ers); United States v. City of Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (opposition to
group home based on purported violations of zoning laws, traffic congestion); Oxford House-
Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991) (city argued that group
home of nine former substance abusers did not constitute a family for purposes of zoning
ordinance). Contra Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992) (ordinance permit-
ting a maximum of four unrelated individuals to occupy a single residence upheld; any dis-
parate impact on handicapped individuals is overcome by city's legitimate interest in con-
trolling noise, traffic, and density).
71. 728 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Minn. 1990), afi'd, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
72. 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
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the relationship between dispersion requirements and the FHAA,
they are distinguished on grounds that Familystyle involved the
application of a state distance requirement while Horizon House
centered on the use of a locally enacted distance limitation. This
distinction is important because it recognizes that dispersion re-
quirements may serve to meet the goal of deinstitutionalization if
enacted on a prospective, state-wide basis.
1. Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul. In
Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, a state law which
required a distance of 1320 feet between community group homes
was challenged as violative of the FHAA.7 3 Familystyle, a provider
of mental health services, leased three properties which were not
permitted to operate as community residences because they failed
to meet the zoning code definition of a nonconforming use. 4 When
Familystyle requested special use permits, the permits were denied
on grounds that operating the facilities would violate the spacing
requirement.7 Familystyle appealed to the City Council, which
granted issuance of the permits conditioned by the requirement
that Familystyle work to disperse its facilities before October 1,
1988, at which time the permits would expire.7 6 Familystyle re-
sponded by applying for a renewal of conditional use permits for
the facilities, but the Planning Commission denied these permits
and declined to modify the spacing requirement."7 At approxi-
mately the same time, the Fair Housing Act was amended to pro-
hibit housing discrimination against individuals with handicaps. S
Familystyle subsequently filed suit, contending that the dispersion
requirement contained in both the Minnesota Human Services Li-
censing Act 9 and the St. Paul Zoning Codes0 conflicted with § 3615
73. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1398.
74. Id. A nonconforming use is defined as "[a] structure the size, dimension or location
of which was lawful prior to the adoption, revision, or amendment of a zoning ordinance,
but which fails to conform to the requirements of the zoning district in which it is located
by reasons of such adoption, revision or amendment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1051 (6th
ed. 1990).
75. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1398.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1399.
79. MINN. STAT. § 245A (1994). "The commissioner shall not grant an initial license to
any residential program if the residential program will be within 1320 feet of an existing
residential program, unless the town, municipality, or county zoning authority grants the
residential program a conditional use or special use permit." Id. § 245A.11, subd. 4.
80. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1398. "The City of St. Paul Zoning Code similarly
provides that community residential facilities serving six or fewer people are permitted,
'subject to the condition that a minimum distance of 1320 feet will be required between
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of the FHAA. 81
The district court first turned to the issue of whether the
FHAA preempted state and local laws. 2 The court pointed out
that the state and local laws do not prohibit mentally ill persons
from buying or renting homes within 1320 feet of a residential fa-
cility. 3 These laws "only relate to the licensure and placement of
residential programs. '8 4 The court further noted that while the
House Report demonstrated an intent to invalidate the state and
local laws such as the ones at issue, the Act did not prohibit the
application of "any and all state laws which have some impact on
the handicapped."", The court rejected the contention that Con-
gress, in prohibiting housing discrimination against individuals
with handicaps, meant to preempt all local regulation of commu-
nity residential facilities.8" The court concluded that there was a
"significant difference between laws which directly regulate indi-
viduals and laws which regulate institutions. '8 7
Having disposed of the preemption issue, the court next ad-
dressed plaintiff's claim that the defendant's action in adopting
the spacing requirement was done so with discriminatory intent to
exclude individuals with handicaps. In making this determination,
the court relied on the disparate treatment test employed in Inter-
zoning lots used for community residential facilities'." Id.
81. Id. at 1400. The relevant portion of the FHAA reads,
[n]othing in this title shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of a State or
political subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in which this title shall
be effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the same rights as are granted by
this title; but any law of a State, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdic-
tion that purports to require or permit any action that would be a discrimina-
tory housing practice under this title shall to that extent be invalid.
42 U.S.C. § 3615 (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
82. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1400. Preemption is a "[d]octrine adopted by U.S.
Supreme Court holding that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed to local,
character that federal laws preempt or take precedence over state [or local laws]. As such, a
state may not pass a law inconsistent with the federal law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1177
(6th ed. 1990).
83. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1400.
84. Id. The court noted that the challenged laws were licensing procedures for the oper-
ation of residential facilities and did not directly prohibit persons with mental illness or
retardation from purchasing or renting homes on their own. Id. But see Smith & Lee Assocs.
v. City of Taylor, Mich., 13 F.3d 920, 931 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[w]e recognize that
the handicapped may have little choice but to live in a commercial home if they desire to
live in a residential neighborhood.").
85. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1401.
86. Id. "Surely the Congress intended states to maintain some control over such facili-
ties. The spacing requirements are a part of Minnesota's licensing process and the zoning
code builds on those requirements in implementing its system." Id.
87. Id.
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national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.88 Analyzing
the state law and its legislative history, the court found that the
purpose of the legislation was to deinstitutionalize individuals with
handicaps.8 9 From this premise, the court found that such a policy
was furthered by the dispersal of facilities because it was part of
an overall commitment to benefit both those individuals with
handicaps and the entire community.90 In short, the court rejected
plaintiff's contention that the law was enacted to discriminate
against the handicapped by limiting their choice of housing.
Last, the court addressed Familystyle's contention that the
dispersion requirement had a discriminatory effect, or disparate
impact on handicapped individuals seeking housing. The court re-
lied on United States v. City of Blackjack l to provide the test for
a prima facie case of disparate impact. In Blackjack, a prima facie
case is made where the practice of the defendant complained of
"actually or predictably results in . . . discrimination; in other
words, that it has a discriminatory effect."92 The court determined
that Familystyle had made out a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact because the dispersion requirement did not limit the housing
choices of any individuals other than those with handicaps.9 3
Continuing its Blackjack analysis, the court shifted the bur-
den to the defendant to demonstrate that a compelling governmen-
tal interest94 was served by the dispersion requirement.9 5 The court
88. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the court was con-
cerned with the disparate impact of an employer's actions. In Familystyle, the court em-
ployed the test to address the impact of the action of the Legislature in passing the law in
question.
89. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1402.
90. Id. at 1402-03.
91. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
92. Id. at 1184.
93. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1403.
Although the laws do not directly regulate the handicapped, they do limit some
facilities where handicapped people would choose to live .... [C]ertain handi-
capped individuals may want to reside at one of the three residences, in a residen-
tial program setting, and not be able to do so because of these laws. If there is
even one person in that situation, the law has a discriminatory effect on that per-
son-it limits the freedom of that individual to live where he or she would wish.
Id.
94. Id. at 1403-04. The district court expressed confusion as to which standard of re-
view it should apply to evaluate the interest of the government in dispersal of group homes
for the handicapped. Id. at 1404 n.10. The court concluded that because Blackjack provided
for strict scrutiny (although in the context of racial discrimination), and no other Eighth
Circuit case had narrowed the test developed in Blackjack, it was the proper standard to
employ. Id. After Familystyle appealed the ruling of the district court, the Eighth Circuit
made it clear that the level of scrutiny appropriate for a disparate impact claim in a Title
VIII case concerning handicap discrimination was the standard set forth in City of Cleburne
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concluded that the government had met its burden of proof. With
regard to the first prong of the Blackjack test requiring that the
law furthered the interests asserted, the court, as it had done with
its analysis of disparate treatment, found that the purpose of the
spacial requirement was to prevent clustering of facilities which
could result in segregation from the mainstream community.9 6
The court then found that there was little private detriment in
applying the dispersion requirement to Familystyle as there was no
evidence that a handicapped person had been turned away because
of the permit denial.9 7 When balancing the private detriment to
the plaintiff with the government's interest in deinstitutionaliza-
tion and the prevention of clustering, the government interest out-
weighed the private interest because the "laws fostering deinstitu-
tionalization seek to enhance the individual lives of all
handicapped and to improve society as a whole through integration
of these people into the mainstream."9 8 The court then concluded
its analysis, finding that less drastic means were not available to
further the interest of deinstitutionalization.99
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
cision.100 The court rejected Familystyle's assertion that the dis-
persion requirements were invalid because they limited the hous-
ing choices of individuals with mental handicaps in violation of the
FHAA. 01° Instead, the court held the "goals of non-discrimination
v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St.
Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1991). Hence, the proper test according to the Eighth Circuit
after a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact is "whether the legisla-
tion which distinguishes between the mentally impaired and others is 'rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.'" Id. (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446).
95. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1403-04. In determining a compelling interest, the
Blackjack court evaluated three factors: (1) whether the ordinance furthered the interest
asserted, (2) whether the public interest served by the ordinance was constitutionally per-
missible and substantial enough to outweigh the private harm caused by it, and (3) whether
there were less drastic means available to attain that interest. Blackjack, 508 F.2d at 1186-
87.
96. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1404. The court accepted the argument that the law
prevented the clustering of facilities, and that this served the policy of deinstitutionalization
by stopping facilities from locating so close to each other that handicapped individuals do
not "interact with the community mainstream." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1405.
99. Id. Interestingly, the court speculates that an argument for reducing the distance
requirement might have more force in the future when the number of homes has grown to
the point where locating such home cannot be done without violating the dispersion require-
ment. However, the court rejects the proposal that reducing the spacing requirement would
be a less drastic means in this case. Id.
100. Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 93-94.
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and deinstitutionalization to be compatible.' ' 1°2 The court stated
that the dispersion requirement:
guarantees that residential treatment facilities will, in fact, be "in the com-
munity," rather than in neighborhoods completely made up of group homes
that recreate an institutional environment .... We cannot agree that Con-
gress intended the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988 to contribute to
the segregation of the mentally ill from the mainstream of our society. 103
The court also rejected Familystyle's disparate impact
claim, 04 and further held that the appropriate level of scrutiny
was not to be measured by the compelling interest standard of
Blackjack, but rather by the rational basis standard annuniciated
by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center.05
2. Horizon House Developmental Services, Inc. v. Township
of Upper Southhampton. In Horizon House Devevelopmental Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Township of Upper Southhampton,' 8 the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania addressed a 1000 foot dispersion require-
ment for group homes. In 1988, Horizon House, a group home pro-
vider, announced its intention to open two group homes in Upper
Southampton, which had no dispersion requirement at the time.10 7
The plan met with strong objections from the neighborhood, and
the Township Manager was directed by the Board of Supervisors
to draft a group home ordinance. 08 The first completed group
home ordinance contained a 2000 foot separation requirement. 09
The town directed Horizon House to comply with the ordinance by
applying for a use permit allowing the two homes to be located
within 800 feet of one another." 0 When this procedure proved
fruitless, Horizon House applied for a variance which was also de-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 94.
104. Id.
105. Id. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See also supra note 94.
106. 804 F. Supp. 683, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
107. Id. at 687.
108. Id. It is noteworthy that the town drafted an ordinance specifically for the place-
ment of group homes for the mentally retarded. A legislative act such as the drawing up of
an ordinance is presumptively valid under the principles of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.12 (1988).
However, Mandelker notes that in some instances, the presumption of constitutionality has
been reversed, especially in litigation involving exclusionary zoning or ordinances which ex-
clude unrelated families or group homes from single family zoned districts. Id. The net re-
sult is that the local government has the burden to justify the land use regulation. Id. § 1.16.
109. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 687-88.
110. Id. at 688.
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nied.111 The town enacted two additional group home ordinances,
both of which had the effect of eliminating plaintiff's group home
proposal because of the dispersion criteria.1 2 A fourth ordinance
with a 1000 foot dispersion requirement was drafted shortly after,
an attempt later characterized by the district court as an effort by
the Town to achieve facial neutrality by deleting all reference to
disability."'
Unlike the decision in Familystyle, the district court did not
address preemption, assuming instead that local zoning practices
such as the dispersion requirement in question fell within the pro-
visions of the FHAA. 11 4 The district court held that the 1000 foot
spacial requirement violated the Fair Housing Act because the re-
quirement created on its face an explicit classification based on
handicap which restricted the ability of persons with handicaps to
live in a community of their choice."1 5 The court further found that
the plaintiff had proven a FHAA violation under both the dispa-
rate impact and disparate treatment theories.1 '
111. Id. The Zoning Hearing Board denied the variance because the homes violated the
3000 foot requirement, and Horizon House had not made a sufficient showing of hardship to
justify the granting of a variance. Id.
112. Id. at 689.
113. Id. at 689-90. The town's attempt to achieve facial neutrality began when it wrote
the third group home ordinance. That ordinance eliminated all references to the types of
disabilities covered which had been specified in the first two ordinances. Id. at 689. The
language of the third ordinance did not delete the phrase "permanent care or professional
supervision" leading the court to find that the Town's policy was to exclude persons with
disabilities. Id. at 694. The drafting of the fourth ordinance similarly included the phrase,
the only change in the ordinance being a reduction of the distance requirement from 2500
feet to 1000 feet. Id. at 689-90.
114. This is in accord with the FHAA legislative history. "The Act is intended to pro-
hibit the application of special requirements through land use regulations, restrictive cove-
nants, and conditional or special use permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of
such individuals to live in the residence of their choice in the community." HousE REPORT,
supra note 65, at 2185. Instead of discussing preemption, the court addressed the applica-
tion of the FHAA to the zoning practices of Upper Southampton in the context of standing:
"The FHAA makes clear that providers [such as Horizon House] have standing to challenge
state or local laws that discriminate against them 'because of handicap' of the 'person[s]
residing in or intending to reside' in their group homes." Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at
692 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(B)). The court cited Baxter v. Belleville, 720 F. Supp
720, 730-31 (S.D. Ill. 1989), for the proposition that "a person who is not himself handi-
capped, but is prevented from providing housing for handicapped persons by a municipal-
ity's discriminatory acts, has standing to sue under the FHAA." Id. It is clear from the
court's analysis that it did not accept the distinction made in Familystyle between location
and placement of group home facilities and the individual right of handicapped persons to
live where they wish.
115. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 693-94.
116. Id. at 695-98. The court presents the following standard for evaluating a FHAA
claim:
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The first issue addressed by the court was the facial validity of
the group home ordinance. In determining whether the ordinance
was valid on its face, the court, citing International Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.,117 looked to the explicit terms of the ordi-
nance, noting that by "using the words 'permanent care' or 'profes-
sional supervision,' the individuals singled out for disparate treat-
ment are those unable to live on their own, who, in the language of
the Fair Housing Act, are 'handicapped.' "11 By requiring on the
face of the ordinance that group homes for handicapped individu-
als be located at least 1000 feet apart, the ordinance discriminated
against those individuals by limiting their choices of where to live,
in violation of the FHAA." 9
An ordinance may create an explicit classification on its face
as long as it is enacted for a legitimate governmental purpose.1 20
The court therefore addressed the town's justification for the ordi-
nance. Recognizing the town's rationale as promoting the integra-
tion of handicapped individuals into the community, the court ap-
plied a rational basis test 21 and found that the town had provided
A violation of the FHAA can be established by demonstrating that the challenged
statute is (sic) discriminates against the handicap on its face and serves no legiti-
mate government interest. A violation of the FHAA may also be established by
demonstrating a "disparate treatment" which occurs when "the defendant was
motivated by an intent to discriminate because of a handicap," or by demonstrat-
ing a "disparate impact" which requires plaintiff to prove, "absent a discrimina-
tory intent on the part of the defendant, the effects of defendant's actions were
nonetheless discriminatory."
Id. at 693 (citing United States v. Schuykill Township, No. 90-2165, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15555, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1990).
117. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). The court quoted the Johnson Controls court:
the absence of a malevolent motive [in drafting an ordinance] does not convert a
facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.
Whether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit
facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but
rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination.
Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 694. While the court in Johnson Controls was referring to
an employment situation, the same principles apply. An ordinance that creates an explicit
classification through its very terms will be scrutinized if the classification involves a group
that is statutorily protected as the handicapped are under the FHAA.
118. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 694.
119. Id. "The language of the ordinance clearly refers to people with handicaps. It ex-
tends to 'any facility' where 'permanent care or professional supervision is present.' Its
reach coincides with the breadth of the definition of 'handicap' under the Fair Housing
Act." Id.
120. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 48, 95. Although the court did not cite to Cleburne, the court used
a similar rationale, finding that the town's rationale was "based upon unsuppported notions
or fears about people with handicaps." Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 695. The failure to
provide a rational basis for the decision to implement the distance requirement for group
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no evidence that this justification was the basis for the decision to
enact the ordinance. 122 More importantly, the court found that in-
tegration through dispersion was not an adequate justification
under the FHAA. The court cited United States v. Starett City
Associates25 and likened the 1000 foot rule to a "ceiling quota im-
posed on minorities for integration maintenance purposes.""24 Be-
cause the dispersion requirement imposed controls which deny
housing on the basis of handicap, the government's purpose, even
if benign, could not be upheld. The court further stated that it was
irrelevant that the spacing requirement also incidentially affected
group homes for non-handicapped individuals.2 5 Thus, the ordi-
nance on its face restricted the housing choices of individuals
based on their handicaps and constituted a quota on the number
of individuals with handicaps who can reside in the Township.1 26
The court next held that the town had exhibited discrimina-
tory intent by the way in which the town had drafted the ordi-
nance. Under the FHAA, a claim of intentional discrimination, or
disparate treatment, is shown where there is an "intentional denial
of housing based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, na-
homes for individuals with mental handicaps where a similar requirement is not imposed on
other group home facilities can be analogized to the failure of the City of Cleburne to justify
a special permit for a group home when similar uses such as nursing homes did not require a
permit.
122. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 695. The town enacted the first group home ordi-
nance after a public meeting showed strong community opposition to the homes. Residents
were concerned that property values would decline and that their children would be unsafe.
Others expressely objected to the presence of people with mental retardation living in their
community. Id. at 687.
123. 840 F.2d. 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
124. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 695. In Starett City, the Second Circuit struck
down a quota designed to maintain racial integration in an apartment complex. The justifi-
cation for the quota was based on the phenomenon known as "tipping," which occurs when
the amount of minorities in a given area exceeds a perceived balance and results in white
flight, where white people move from the area. The quota had resulted in minority appli-
cants having to wait up to ten times longer than white applicants for apartments. Starett
City, 840 F.2d at 1098-99. The court found that the Fair Housing Act was not intended to
promote racial integration in housing through the use of controls which deny housing on the
basis of race if nondiscriminatory policies are likely to result in resegregation. Tipping "can-
not serve to justify attempts to maintain integration at Starett City through inflexible racial
quotas that are neither temporary in nature nor used to remedy past discrimination or im-
balance within the complex." Id. at 1100-1102.
125. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 694. This logic may be flawed. If an ordinance
imposes requirements that all group homes and other similar uses must meet certain re-
quirements in order to be permitted in an otherwise incompatible zone, it can be argued
that the individuals with handicaps have no less a right to locate in the community than do
other non-handicapped individuals. In this instance, the ordinance is applied uniformly as a
function of the general power of legislatures to decide what is an incompatible use.
126. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 694.
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tional origin, or handicap."' 27 The court recognized that although a
hostile motive is not necessary to prove discriminatory intent, dis-
criminatory animus was clearly demonstrated by the circumstances
surrounding the development of the dispersion requirement. 12 The
court found that the spacing requirement arose as a direct "re-
sponse to community opposition and to outmoded fears about peo-
ple with mental retardation.' 29 Because the town's action in en-
acting an ordinance based on such fears does not support a
rational basis for the regulation, the FHAA was violated. 30
Finally, the court discussed the discriminatory effect or dispa-
rate impact that the dispersion requirement had on handicapped
individuals seeking housing in the township. The court looked to
the disparate impact test formulated in Arlington Heights' for
guidance on discriminatory effect in the housing context. The four
pronged Arlington test included an evaluation of (1) the strength
of the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect, (2) whether there
is evidence of discriminatory intent in some form, (3) whether the
defendant's interest in taking the action complained of is legiti-
mate, and (4) whether the plaintiff is asking the court to force the
defendant to affirmatively provide housing for a protected class, or
is asking the court to prevent the defendant from interfering with
individual property owners who wish to provide such housing. 32
Applying this test, the court held that the 1000 foot distance re-
quirement had a discriminatory effect on the housing choices of
handicapped individuals. 3 3
Addressing the first prong of the test regarding plaintiff's
showing of discriminatory effect, the court noted that the spacing
requirement had the effect of limiting the number of handicapped
people in the town, their choices of where to live, and their access
to community resources.3 Furthermore, the requirement affected
127. Id. at 696 (quoting Schylkill Township, No. 90-2165, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15555,
at *20 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1990))
128. Id. at 696.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 697. The court stated:
[t]hese views are unfounded and are not based on any credible opinion or evidence
concerning group homes and people with mental retardation. The evidence...
shows that group homes have no adverse impact on the property values ... ; they
do not impose a greater burden on public services ... than other single family
dwellings; they are not noisier or denser than a single family residence.
Id. at 696-97.
131. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
132. Id. at 1290.
133. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 697.
134. Id.
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providers such as Horizon House, who would be precluded from
establishing additional homes even though both the sites and the
funding were available.13 5 The second prong, a showing of some
discriminatory intent, was fulfilled by Horizon House based on the
evidence that the ordinance was enacted as a result of community
fears about people with mental retardation.3 6
In determining whether the town's interest was sufficient to
justify the drafting of the dispersion requirement, the court noted
that Arlington placed the burden upon the defendant to prove
that its actions furthered "a legitmate, bona fide governmental in-
terest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less
discriminatory effect."'3 7 The court specifically addressed one of
the rationales discussed in Familystyle, that dispersion require-
ments act to prevent a clustering of group homes which produce a
ghettoization effect. In dismissing the Township's argument that
avoidance of clustering was a legitimate governmental interest, the
court noted that "[t]he FHAA rejects any notion that a Township
can somehow avoid the anti-discrimination mandate by accepting
some sort of 'fair share' or apportionment of people with disabili-
ties."' 38 More importantly, the court held that there is no evidence
"that people with handicaps living close to one another is per se
detrimental," and that "meaningful integration" can only be ac-
complished if the handicapped persons are included physically in
the community and are not restricted in deciding where to live. 13
Even if the avoidance of clustering was a legitimate interest, the
court noted that there were less discriminatory ways to accomplish
this goal."1
Plaintiffs have proved that there are discriminatory effects directly related to the
1000-foot requirement. The spacing requirement limits the numbers of people
with handicaps within the Township, limits their choices on where to live, limits
their access to essential community resources, and thwarts the efforts to treat peo-
ple with handicaps equally in the community negatively affecting their self-
esteem.
Id.
135. Id. at 697-98.
136. Id. at 698. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
137. Id. (quoting Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d
Cir.), affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)).
138. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 698. See also City of Peekskill v. Rehabilitation
Support Servs., 806 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that "[p]reventing housing for
disabled people on the grounds that the City has already provided its fair share.., comes
periliously close to violating the Fair Housing Act.").
139. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 698.
140. Id. at 698-99. The court found that the 1000 foot rule was overbroad. For example,
the requirement would prevent two homes which happened to be on opposite sides of a lake
from locating 1000 feet from one another, despite the fact that the homes are in two sepa-
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Lastly, the court held that the relief sought by Horizon House
declaring the ordinance unconstitutional did not ask that the town
affirmatively establish housing, only that the town no longer re-
strict Horizon House from locating its housing within a certain dis-
tance of other similar housing.141
3. Analysis of the Familystyle and Horizon House Decisions.
The different approaches to dispersion requirements expressed in
Familystyle and Horizon House reflect the difficulties which courts
face in evaluating municipal and state zoning practices concerning
the establishment of group homes for handicapped persons under
the FHAA. It may be useful to further distinguish the two cases so
that a clearer picture is developed regarding this issue.
One obvious difference between the two opinions lies in the
acceptance of the government's rationale for imposing dispersion
requirements. In both instances, the government attempted to rely
on the rationale that dispersion of group home facilities would ne-
cessitate the integration of handicapped individuals into main-
stream society. Requiring dispersal would prevent the ghettoiza-
tion and clustering of group home facilities and resegregation.1 42
The apparent conflict between the two courts regarding the
legitimacy of the government's purpose may lie in the circum-
stances of the two situations. In Familystyle, the court was
charged with reviewing a state licensing law (similar to the
Padavan Law) designed to provide individuals with mental illness
with the "benefits of normal residential surroundings."'1 43 In con-
trast, the Horizon House court addressed a town ordinance which
was enacted to regulate group home location through local level
decision-making.144
The fact that Familystyle was concerned with a state law
while Horizon House addressed a local ordinance plays into each
court's analysis of the dispersion requirement as it relates to the
FHAA. The Familystyle court emphasized that it was the state's
interest in deinstitutionalization which was at stake. The court
noted that state zoning statutes such as the one at issue "guaran-
tee that local governments cannot frustrate state and national pol-
icy of permitting mentally retarded persons to participate in nor-
rate neighborhoods and clustering would not be a concern.
141. Id. at 699.
142. See id. at 694-95; Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 728 F. Supp
1396, 1402-03 (D. Minn. 1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
143. Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 93 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 245A.11, subd. 1 (1994)).
144. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 683.
[Vol. 44272
GROUP HOMES
mal residential communities.' 145 Underlying the court's opinion is
the belief that a state mandated policy can serve to protect the
interests of handicapped persons by providing a mechanism by
which group homes can forego the local zoning procedures for plac-
ing a group home in a residential community. There is a strong
argument that without such a procedure, access to normal residen-
tial settings for individuals with handicaps would be far more
difficult.
The concern that the Familystyle court expressed over local
zoning for group homes appears to manifest itself in the facts
before the Horizon House court. In Horizon House, the court in-
validated a local ordinance as violative of the FHAA in part be-
cause the motives of the local governmental body clearly showed
an intent to prevent Horizon House from establishing group homes
in the town.14 6 The court found that the ordinance was passed in
response to community opposition to the Horizon House group
home proposal. 147 It is this type of local zoning practice which led
states such as Minnesota to pass state mandated group home
placement legislation.1 48
While the state's purpose in imposing dispersion requirements
may be regarded as more benign (i.e., not enacted with discrimina-
tory intent) than a similar requirement enacted locally, there is
still the issue of whether the requirement has a discriminatory ef-
fect on housing choices for handicapped persons. As the Familys-
tyle court recognized, state mandated procedures on their face dis-
criminate against individuals with handicaps by virtue of placing
requirements on their choice of housing to which no other group is
subject. 149 A challenge to state laws mandating procedures for
group home sitings can be mounted as it was in Familystyle, but
disparate impact analysis turns on the strength of the government
interest in the action taken, 50 which as previously explained, may
be given more weight when a state law, which is enacted to circum-
vent the normal politics of zoning, places certain conditions on the
group protected under the statute. On the other hand, evidence
that a law was enacted with improper motive, as in Horizon House,
could improve a disparate impact claim. Such evidence would
145. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1402 (quoting Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313
N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn. 1981)).
146. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 695-97.
147. Id. at 696. Under the state mandated procedure for siting group homes, such com-
munity opposition would theoretically have less of an impact on the eventual placement of
the group home in the community.
148. Familystyle, 728 F. Supp. at 1402.
149. Id. at 1403.
150. Id. at 1403-04.
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clearly detract from the stated legitimate purpose of the govern-
ment in enacting the provision.
When the result in both cases is examined, it appears that the
approach to dispersion requirements in Horizon House best fits
the goals and purposes of the FHAA. Unlike Familystyle, the Ho-
rizon House analysis places determinative emphasis on access by
the handicapped to housing of their choice, and does not make the
assumption that individuals with handicaps should be restricted
from certain areas of the community for their own good."", Such an
attitude toward handicapped persons can serve to foster stereo-
types about them. Further, the rationale that dispersion is a legiti-
mate method to promote integration was found to be an inade-
quate justification under the FHAA.152 A quota to maintain
integration of individuals with handicaps should be treated no dif-
ferently than a racial quota designed to prevent white flight. s15
Both have the effect of excluding individuals from residing in the
community of their choice.
However, strong arguments also exist for the continuation of
the policy of deinstitutionalization through the use of state man-
dated siting procedures. Most important is that state laws can op-
erate to stifle the "not in my backyard" syndrome which plagues
group home projects by preempting local zoning procedures. With
the involvement of the state, facilities can be readily placed in
more diverse settings, allowing meaningful integration into main-
stream living. The problem with state mandated procedures are
the conditions which are attached to the siting of a group home,
such as the rigid 1320 foot dispersion requirement in Familystyle.
Requiring that group homes be dispersed may fit the general policy
of deinstitutionalization, but dispersion requirements appear to go
against the general mandate of the FHAA that handicapped indi-
viduals be permitted access to housing of their choice. As indicated
by the Familystyle case, however, the courts appear willing to ac-
cept such requirements as long as they are enacted to further the
goal of deinstitutionalization. 5 4 Whether a state law imposing a
151. Municipal Tag Team, supra note 68, at 329-30.
152. Horizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southhampton,
804 F. Supp. 683, 695, aff'd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993). The court cited United States v.
Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1989).
153. Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 695.
154. Familystyle is cited without comment or approval in a number of cases. See City
of Edmonds v. Washington State Building Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994) (cited
for the proposition that Congress did not intend to segregate the mentally ill from main-
stream society); Oxford House v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (court
applied Familystyle discriminatory impact theory); Martin v. Constance, 843 F. Supp. 1321
(E.D. Mo. 1994) (rejecting a broadening of Familystyle rationale which would permit a site
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strict numerical distance limitation between community residences
is therefore justified is a different question, a topic discussed in
Part III infra.
C. Dispersion Requirements in the Wake of Familystyle and
Horizon House
Subsequent cases examining the legitimacy of dispersion re-
quirements have not resolved the issues addressed in Familystyle
and Horizon House. Whether the FHAA preempts state and local
laws regarding the licensure and location of group homes is still an
open question. At least two cases have followed Familystyle's hold-
ing that state and local licensing laws are not preempted by the
FHAA. 155 In Plymouth Charter Township v. Department of Social
Services,156 a challenge to Michigan's Adult Foster Care Facility
Licensing Act [AFCFLA] 157  which provided for among other
things, a 1500 foot dispersion requirement, was held not to conflict
with the FHAA. 158 As in Familystyle, the court distinguished state
procedures regulating the licensure of facilities, and legislation
prohibiting individuals from residing wherever they choose.159 SiM-
rejection based on the fact that other homes existed in the state); North Shore-Chicago
Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Village of Skokie, 827 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Inl. 1993) (citing Familys-
tyle's use of the rational relationship standard of scrutiny); Plymouth Charter Township v.
Dep't of Social Servs., 501 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (relying on Familystyle hold-
ing that FHAA did not preempt challenged state statutes); In re Township of Warren, 622
A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1993); Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992); Stewart B.
McKinney Found. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Fairfield, 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn.
1992) (indicating that plaintiff can make out both discriminatory impact and discriminatory
intent claims when litigating a FHAA claim); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County,
Pa., 784 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp. 797 F. Supp. 918 (C.D.
Utah 1992) (also holding that state statutes not preempted by FHAA), rev'd, 46 F.3d 1491
(10th Cir. 1995).
155. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 797 F. Supp. 918 (D. Utah 1992), rev'd, 46 F.3d
1491 (10th Cir. 1995); Plymouth Charter Township v. Dep't of Social Servs., 501 N.W.2d 186
(Mich. 1993).
156. 501 N.W.2d 186.
157. MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 400.701-.737. (1988 & Supp. 1995). Under this law, the De-
partment of Social Services was required to (1) notify the clerk of the local government
forty-five days before the issuance of the license that it had received the license application,
(2) assess the concentration of adult foster care facilities in the local governmental unit, (3)
assess whether a licensed adult foster care facility exists within a 1500 foot radius of the
proposed site and (4) give notice to property owners located within 1500 feet of the pro-
posed site. Plymouth Charter, 501 N.W.2d at 187.
158. Plymouth Charter, 501 N.W.2d at 188.
159. Id.
In this regard, we fully agree with the observation of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals that 'Congress did not abrogate a state's power to determine how facili-
ties for the mentally ill must meet licensing standards.' If Congress wants to ex-
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ilarly, in Bangerter v. Orem City Corp.,' a state law which al-
lowed municipalities to attach conditions to use permits required
for group homes to operate was held not to conflict with the FHAA
because of Utah's interest that "the handicapped be integrated
into normal surroundings.""'
The principles underlying the Horizon House decision have
led other courts to reject state laws which regulate the licensing
and placement of group homes. 62 In Larkin v. State of Michi-
pand the scope of the federal act to include commercial enterprises or organiza-
tions, then Congress should say so.
Id. at 188-89 (quoting Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th
Cir. 1991)).
160. 797 F. Supp. 918 (D. Utah 1992), rev'd, 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
161. Id. at 922. In Bangerter, the group home provider applied for a permit to operate
the home pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5 (1953). Id. at 920. The permit was granted
on two conditions: that the group home provider "provide assurances that the residents of
the facility will be properly supervised on a 24-hour basis; and the operator of the facility
establish a community advisory committee" through which complaints could be addressed.
Id. Bangerter brought suit alleging violations of the FHAA, arguing that the adopted ordi-
nance had a discriminatory effect on individuals with handicaps. Id. at 923. The court first
held that the state licensing laws were not preempted by the FHAA because the regulations
"only placed restrictions on residential programs seeking to provide housing for groups of
handicapped individuals." Id. at 922 (quoting Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc., v. City of St.
Paul, 728 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (D. Minn 1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991)). The court
then turned to Bangerter's discriminatory impact claim, noting that a prima facie case had
been made by the plaintiff because the ordinance facially treated the handicapped residents
differently from non-handicapped residents. Id. The burden then shifted to the defendants
to demonstrate that "the distinction made by the challenged ordinance between the men-
tally impaired and others [was] 'rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.' "Id.
(quoting Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 94). The court determined that the government had met
this burden-the purpose of integrating the handicapped into residential surroundings was
met by the requirement that the residents be properly supervised on a 24 hour basis. Id. at
922-23. The district court's decision was subsequently reversed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir.
1995). Rejecting the district court's preemption analysis, the court noted that while the
FHAA "does not completely preempt all state and local regulations of housing of the dis-
abled," such regulations are preempted "to the extent they violate the Fair Housing Act."
Id. at 1500. The court also found that the district court had erred in failing to recognize that
Bangerter had made out a prima facie case for intentional discrimination by demonstrating
that the ordinance was facially discriminatory. The court noted that in a housing discrimi-
nation context, "a plaintiff need not prove the malice or discriminatory animus of a defend-
ant to make out a case of intentional discrimination. Where the defendant expressly treats
someone protected by the FHAA in a different manner than others." Id. at 1501. Accord-
ingly, the court remanded the case for consideration of Bangerter's intentional discrimina-
tion claims. Id. at 1502.
162. See Larkin v. State of Michigan, 883 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (invalidating
state statutory scheme which set a 1500 foot distance requirement and banned excessive
concentration of adult foster care homes); Association for Advancement of the Mentally
Handicapped v. City of Elizabeth, 876 F. Supp. 614 (D.N.J. 1994) (invalidating provision of
state law permitting the denial of conditional use permits where proposed home is within
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gan,165 a federal district court in Michigan came to a conclusion
contrary to that of Plymouth Charter Township16 4 in holding that
the AFCFLA violated the FHAA. 65 The plaintiff, who wished to
open an adult foster care home for four handicapped individuals,
applied for a license pursuant to the process required under the
AFCFLA. 66 The application was denied because another facility
was located within 1500 feet of the proposed facility.267 The plain-
tiff brought suit, alleging that the 1500 foot dispersion requirement
violated the FHAA, as well as the Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the United States Constitution.1' s
Predictably, plaintiff's arguments employed the rationale set
forth in Horizon House while the defendant relied on Familystyle
to argue the validity of the state law. As in Familystyle, the de-
fendants argued that the statutory scheme was not preempted by
the FHAA because the the state law was directed at regulating
commercial facilities, not the ability of handicapped persons to live
where they choose.6 9 In contrast to Familystyle, however, the
court rejected this argument, finding the distinction "illusory"
based on the legislative intent of the FHAA.1
7 0
1500 feet of another community residence); Cf. United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F.
Supp. 872 (W.D. Wisc. 1991) (holding that failure to grant exception to 2500 foot require-
ment violated FHAA, but not deciding as to validity of dispersion requirement); Potomac
Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Md. 1993) (invalidating
county licensing scheme as violative of the FHAA).
163. 883 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
164. 501 N.W.2d 186 (Mich. 1993).
165. Larkin, 883 F. Supp. at 179-80.
166. Id. at 174.
167. Id.
168. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff argued "that the notice, distancing, and excessive con-
centration requirements [of] the Adult Foster Care Facility Licensing Act (AFCFLA) have a
disparate impact [upon those individuals] with disabilities." Id. at 176. The notice require-
ment required the Department of Social Services to notify the municipality of its intention
to site a facility within its boundaries, and the municipality to then inform all neighbors
within 1500 feet of the proposed site. Id. Plaintiff further argued that this requirement
often provoked negative responses from neighbors, thereby restricting housing options. Id.
With respect to the excessive concentration and 1500 foot dispersion requirement, the plain-
tiff argued that both provisions acted to limit the housing choices of the handicapped by
restricting the number and location of homes that can exist within a municipality. Id.
169. Id. at 178.
170. Id.
Nothwithstanding the decisions in Familystyle and Plymouth, this court finds
that by regulating residential facilities, the Michigan statutes inherently regulate,
and consequently, discriminate against handicapped individuals. The House Re-
port ... outlines the types of local zoning regulations that the FHAA is intended
to prohibit.... As such, the Michigan statutory scheme conflicts with and is pre-
empted by the FHAA.
Id. at 178-79.
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The court then analyzed the government's rationale for imple-
menting the statutory scheme. The defendant maintained that the
state law prevented the "formation of 'ghettos' of AFC homes,"
thereby resulting in reinstitutionalization. 7 1 The court rejected
this assertion as well, relying in part on the analysis employed in
Horizon House which analogized dispersion requirements to racial
quotas.172 As such, the court held that there was no rational basis
for either the 1500 foot dispersion requirement or the neighbor no-
tification requirement and invalidated those provisions of the state
law.17 3
Whether the Larkin court's treatment of state statutory
schemes which include dispersion requirements will be followed re-
mains to be seen. Despite the court's holding, questions remain re-
garding the relationship between state regulation of community
residences and the FHAA. With regard to the Padavan Law, Part
III will examine how the decisions in Horizon House and Larkin
may not act to similarly invalidate New York's site selection
process.
III. THE PADAVAN LAW AND THE FHAA
The relationship between the Padavan Law and the FHAA
has not yet been determined. Because New York State providers
have not been faced with a determination that a substantial altera-
tion of an area has occurred due to overconcentration,7 4 there has
been no opportunity for a provider to challenge the legality of the
overconcentration provision as violative of the FHAA.
The fact that the overconcentration provision of the Padavan
Law has not been challenged under the FHAA does not mean that
such a challenge cannot be mounted. As explained previously, the
increased number of group homes could eventually lead to a deter-
mination by the Commissioner of overconcentration. 17' The ques-
tion which remains is whether the overconcentration language of
the Padavan Law should be held violative of the FHAA as discrim-
inating against individuals with mental handicaps on the basis of
171. Id. at 176. The defendants further asserted that the dispersion requirements were
necessary to provide a normal environment for handicapped persons, and allow for integra-
tion into mainstream society. Id. at 177-78.
172. Id. at 177.
173. Id. The court further found that defendants, the State of Michigan and the Michi-
gan Department of Social Services, violated the Equal Protection Clause by enacting and
enforcing the now invalidated provisions which had a discriminatory effect on individuals
with handicaps. Id.
174. See cases cited supra note 53 and accompanying text.
175. Rice, supra note 23, at S-8.
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disability.
While the question is not easy, strong arguments can be made
that the Padavan Law's overconcentration provision is the proper
standard to apply in furthering New York State's goal of deinstitu-
tionalization. First and foremost, the provision lacks precise defini-
tion, recognizing only that the municipality has some say in where
group homes are placed.7 6 In lieu of a clear definition, courts have
interpreted the provision liberally in favor of group home provid-
ers, satisfying the Legislature's intent by rejecting most overcon-
centration arguments summarily.
1 7
A hypothetical will illustrate why the imprecise language of
the overconcentration provision promotes the State policy of dein-
stitutionalization. Suppose a group home provider wishes to locate
a home which is located within 1000 feet of a similar group home
in the same community. Under the rigid 1320 feet dispersion re-
quirement in Familystyle, the group home provider would be re-
quired to obtain a special permit in order to place the group home
at that location.178 This is true even if the homes are separated by
a river, highway, or other obstacle which places the home in differ-
ent neighborhoods respectively. 79
Using the same set of facts under the overconcentration provi-
sion of the Padavan Law, the second group home will not be
barred from locating within 1000 feet of the other group home.
The language of the overconcentration provision is broad enough
that group homes can locate any distance from one another, even
next door. In the hypothetical, the fact that the homes would be
located in two different neighborhoods would be taken into ac-
176. See supra note 28. See generally, Not in my Neighborhood, supra note 27, at 330.
In making his recommendations for changes in the Padavan Law, Schonfeld specifically ar-
gued that "the statute not be changed to include a definition of the term 'substantial altera-
tion' since any definition would be inadequate to encompass the myriad neighborhood situa-
tions in New York State . . ." Id.
177. See cases cited supra note 51 and accompanying text. The claim that the term
'substantial alteration' is too vague has been rejected by the courts. See supra notes 35-36
and accompanying text.
178. MINN. STAT. § 245A.11 (1988).
179. See United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Wis. 1991). In
Village of Marshall, an exception to a 2500 foot dispersion requirement was denied by the
Village Board which had such discretion to do so under the state law. Id. at 873. In holding
that the denial of the exception violated the FHAA, the court noted that the Board, in
adhering rigidly to the 2500 foot requirement, failed to account for the fact that the "'effec-
tive distance between the properties was in excess of the 2500 foot requirement by virtue of
the Menausha River." Id. at 879. The court rejected the Village's argument that it was
merely adhering to the state requirement, finding that an "an exception in this case would
[not] undermine the purpose of the statute." Id. at 879.
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count when determining overconcentration °80 As the cases demon-
strate, it is almost a certain rule that no overconcentration exists
on these facts.181 Clearly, the Legislature's intent to place individu-
als with mental handicaps in residential communities is being fos-
tered by the site selection procedure in the Padavan Law. 1 2
The overconcentration provision is also flexible enough to rec-
ognize that too many homes in one place can be detrimental to the
goal of deinstitutionalization. Suppose group homes have been con-
sistently locating in Town "X" for a number of years, with "Y
Street" having fifteen such homes on a street of twenty total
homes. On these facts, a challenge that overconcentration and a
substantial alteration in the community has occurred could very
well succeed.1 83 While it can be argued that denying the sixteenth
group home on grounds of overconcentration restricts the housing
choices of those with mental handicaps, the result should neverthe-
less be regarded as proper. Because the goal of deinstitutionaliza-
tion is to bring individuals with mental handicaps into mainstream
society, permitting group homes to cluster defeats this purpose by
resegregating those individuals. While this contradicts the Horizon
House holding that integration is not an adequate justification
under the FHAA,18 4 that rationale was arguably based on the fact
that the town enacted a rigid dispersion requirement not unlike
the Familystyle limitation, which acted as a quota on the number
of people who could live in the town. The Padavan Law enacts no
such quota, leaving it to the Commissioner'8 5 and the reviewing
courts' 8 to look at the particular circumstances of each case to de-
180. See Fisher v. Webb, 523 N.Y.S.2d 639 (App. Div. 1988). In holding that petitioner
lad failed to show that the establishment of a community residence would result in a sub-
stantial alteration of the community where three community residences would exist within
one mile of each other, the court stated, "the record demonstrates that the proposed site is
'isolated sufficiently from other similar facilities so as to avoid undue concentration in the
relevant geographical area' and is in a separate and discrete neighborhood unaffected by
the other existing community residences... ." Id. at 640 (emphasis added) (quoting Matter
of Inc. Village of Westbury v. Prevost, 467 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (App. Div. 1983) and citing
Matter of City of Newburgh v. Webb, 507 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 1986)).
181. See supra cases cited note 53 and accompanying text.
182. See source cited supra note 24 and accompanying text.
183. Because the New York courts have not found an overconcentration of facilites re-
sulting in a substantial alteration of the community, it is conceded that it is speculative
whether such finding would be made given these facts. See, e.g., Fisher, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 640
(finding that the character of the neighborhood would not be changed where a group home
of eight severely handicapped individuals was to be located on a street where only fourteen
individuals resided).
184. Horizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton,
804 F. Supp. 683, 698 (E.D. Penn. 1992), aff'd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).
185. N.Y. MENTAL HYo. § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney 1994).
186. Id. § 41.34(d).
280 [Vol. 44
GROUP HOMES
termine whether overconcentration and substantial alteration in
the character of the community has resulted.
The proposition that the Padavan Law's benefits outweigh any
detrimental effects it has on housing choices for handicapped per-
sons is further supported by the positive impact of the law in
terms of placing homes in residential communities.18 7 Opposition
to group homes is not going to disappear as stereotypes continue to
exist toward individuals with handicaps. 18 8 Without the law, handi-
capped persons will undoubtedly find it harder to locate in resi-
dential communities. While one can argue that only the overcon-
centration provision be eliminated from the law, thereby ensuring
a site selection process without a requirement to avoid undue con-
centration, the provision has been demonstrated to effectuate state
policy goals and should not be stricken from the statute.
Even if the overconcentration provision were invoked and a
provider subsequently sued, claiming that the provision violated
the FHAA, prior precedent would suggest that the provision will
be upheld. Familystyle dealt with a similar state law which was
upheld by the Eighth Circuit, and that particular law can be char-
acterized as far more rigid and subject to challenge than the over-
concentration provision of the Padavan Law. Other cases have re-
lied on the rationale of Familystyle,89 lending further credence to
the argument that a challenge to the Padavan Law's overconcen-
tration provision would likely fail.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of dispersion requirements on group homes for indi-
viduals with handicaps is a troublesome issue which has been ad-
dressed with differing results. While any requirement that limits
the ability of an individual to live where he or she wishes is prob-
lematic, state laws which impose distance requirements between
group homes as part of a policy to deinstitutionalize handicapped
individuals are quite different in nature from dispersion require-
ments enacted on a local level which purport to serve the same
purpose. It is recommended that such state laws, however, be
amended to eliminate dispersion requirements which rigidly im-
pose numerical distance limitations between community resi-
dences. An example of a better alternative is seen in the Padavan
Law, which employs a standard which is flexible enough to meet
187. See cases cited supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 2.
189. Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 728 F. Supp. 1396, 1403 (D. Minn.
1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
1996]
282 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
the important goal of deinstitutionalization without imposing in-
flexible burdens on the housing choices of individuals with
handicaps.
